

Least worst options: understanding voter attitudes in the run up to the 2025 Budget

Persuasion UK, October 2025


Lead author: Steve Akehurst







Acknowledgements

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Executive summary





In light of the fiscal situation facing the UK government heading into this year's budget, this report seeks to answer in depth the following questions: **“Where do voters stand on the issue of taxation, how do they deal with trade-offs facing the government and to what extent, if at all, might they be persuaded to support broad-based tax rises, including those which may breach the 2024 Labour manifesto?”**

In short, we find:

1. The government is in an extremely challenging operating environment. The electorate is feeling squeezed and distrustful, with all of the key predictors of willingness to pay more tax pointing in the wrong direction from the government's perspective.
2. In this environment, most voters' overwhelming first preference is that narrow groups at the top – for instance those earning over £100,000 a year or with over £1 million in wealth, or big businesses – pay more. They also show deep levels of distrust in the state to spend money raised effectively. Unsurprisingly therefore many people's starting point is ‘anyone but me’, regardless of the trade-offs that entails.
3. It is possible, however, that the choice facing policymakers will not be that easy, given how uncertain or limited the revenue from these kind of taxes can be. Instead, it's plausible they are forced to pick between two bad options: fail in key policy areas that require extra spending or breach promises made in the Labour manifesto not to raise broad-based taxes.

If that is indeed the choice, our research is clear: *breaching the manifesto is the least worst option*. While there is an electoral penalty for raising taxes the government said they would not raise, it is notably lower than the penalty for manifestly failing on public services, energy bills and child poverty. This is especially true with Labour 2024 voters. Re-building Britain's crumbling public realm especially was central to Labour's 2024 mandate.

4. Manifesto breaching rises – such as income tax – would be very difficult for the government to communicate on, but public opinion is not completely closed off to argument or persuasion. It requires connecting with their



interests as well as a self-confident approach, making a positive argument rather than a defensive one.

In this regard, the best strategic communications approaches probably involve a renewed focus on cost of living – giving some of the tax raised back in large energy bill discounts, for instance – while emphasising themes of fairness: everyone is being asked to chip in more to fix things, but those at the top are being asked for the most.

If the manifesto is to be broken, arguably the government should do this properly; raising enough to deliver on public services in the long term, give something back to voters in the short term and building fiscal headroom for the Parliament. Likely the worst place to be in electorally would be to raise enough tax to anger voters but not enough to make a tangible difference to their lives (eg public services or cost of living).

5. Even still, this area also raises tricky coalitional dilemmas for Labour. While some Labour to Reform switchers can be persuaded to tax rises, overall they are easily the most difficult of Labour's swing groups to carry or persuade, owing to their high levels of distrust and also squeezed incomes. Other groups – such as soft Conservative or Green voters open to Labour – would probably need to be brought into the government's coalition to replace those further alienated by tax rises, if indeed the government did pursue this course.





Introduction: policy context and research questions


As it approaches its second Budget, the Labour government is in a bind – one partly of its own making. The imperative to fix the public realm, especially public services, was an important part of the mandate given by voters to the party at last year's general election. At the same time part of securing that victory involved pledging not to raise key taxes in order to reassure voters and close down opposition attacks on its economic brand.

Even prior to this year, this left the government with limited room for manoeuvre to fix a set of problems it now owned. But a shift in global economic conditions – partly brought about by Donald Trump's return to the White House – has only tightened things further. Analysis suggests that large sums of money – £30 billion – must be found just to stand still in relation to its day-to-day fiscal rules.

Electoral and bond market considerations probably close off large scale spending cuts or further adjustments to fiscal rules, leaving tax as the major lever available to the Chancellor – not just for filling in the fiscal hole but driving investment into priority areas more broadly.

While it is easy to criticise pre-election pledges on taxation, these were at least made in response to legitimate dilemmas. Although key swing voters are angry at the poor state of public services, they are also feeling squeezed by historic cost-of-living pressures. At the same time, weak productivity makes policymakers nervous about further business taxation. In this sense, the government faces a classic trilemma between cost of living, public services and economic growth, with action on one often trading off against action on another.

How the government weighs up these political and electoral risks will shape how the country is governed in the coming years. So how should they seek to understand or navigate public opinion in these circumstances? This research represents the most in-depth attempt to answer this challenge so far. In doing so, it seeks to answer the below research questions:




- What is voters' starting point or baseline views on tax and spend in the current environment?
- To what extent is it possible to persuade key voter groups on certain tax rises, including broad-based tax rises which may breach the 2024 Labour manifesto?
- Relatedly, how might the government weigh up the trade-offs and counterfactuals it faces, since these shape its decisions? That is, what is the latest evidence on what key voters will reward and punish the government for by the time of the next election?
- What are the best communication strategies for increasing permission structure around tax rises, and what – if any – coalitional choices do they present for parties or communicators wishing to make the case to voters?

Methodology

These questions were explored through the following steps:

- Four scoping focus groups with a mixture of swing voters, including three groups of voters who have defected from Labour since the 2024 general election, and one with a group of non-Labour voters but who are open to supporting the government. These were used to surface hypotheses to explore in subsequent quantitative work and were conducted in June 2025.
- A survey of 9,000 UK voters conducted through NorStat in August 2025. This collected data on baseline attitudes to different policy options and narrative divides, as well as involving a competitive message testing process.
- A conjoint experiment involving 4,000 UK voters conducted via YouGov in August 2025, this was used to surface what factors will most shape how voters will judge the government's track record by the 2028 general election.

In the analysis phase, we paid particular attention to the below swing groups, alongside voters at large. This is not because they are the only groups that matter in the electorate, but because they are the most important in seeking



to understand the electoral dilemmas of the Budget from the government's perspective:

- Labour 2024 voters – the overall coalition that delivered Labour its 2024 victory.
- Labour to Reform defectors – those that have switched since 2024. Where sample sizes are too small, 'Labour defectors to right parties' is used instead, combining Labour to Reform and Conservative switchers. About 3% of the electorate in total.
- Labour defectors to left parties – those that have switched from Labour to one of the Greens, Lib Dems, Plaid or SNP since July 2024. About 4% of the electorate.
- All potential switchers to Labour – those who did not vote Labour in 2024 but are open to doing so at the next election (>5/10 on a willingness to vote scale). About 9% of the electorate.
 - We pay particular attention to potential Conservative switchers to Labour, since there are a great many of Conservative voters in marginal seats. About 4% of the electorate.
- All voters who are still open to voting Labour (>5/10 on a willingness to vote scale), which represents about 30% of the electorate as of August/September 2025.

For brevity, the graphs in this report mostly just cover those voter groups. However, if you would like to see the attitudes of other groups in the electorate (eg Con 2024 or Reform 2024 voters), these are available in the slidedeck accompanying this report on the Persuasion website ('just give me the graphs').



Key findings

Finding #1: The government is in an extremely challenging operating environment. The electorate is feeling squeezed and distrustful, with all of the key predictors of willingness to pay more tax pointing in the wrong direction.

To a surprisingly large extent, the willingness or not of a voter to pay more tax for a particular cause is predicted by just three or four key variables.

The largest – and most obvious – is their personal income, with higher income voters more open than lower. The second is their positivity towards the government. The third and fourth relate to efficacy: to what extent do they think any particular area (eg the NHS) requires more investment, compared to making better use of existing money? To what extent do they trust government to spend the extra money raised effectively?

There is downward pressure on all of these variables at the moment. In part this relates to the cost of living squeeze, and in part it reflects the fact that the government won on a fairly low share of the vote – so simply started off with a smaller pool of voters positively disposed towards it.

There is also a particular psephological slant to this. Around 25% of voters report they are struggling, but this rises to 36% of Labour to Reform voters that Downing Street prize so highly. It is these voters who are also more likely to say they ‘put more in’ to the state than they get out, though that is a sentiment widely held among voters at large.




Financial situation of voters

While most voters are living comfortably, Lab to Reform voters are more likely to report struggling. In general, defection from Labour is more marked among financial strugglers.

"Would you say that on your present household income you are..."

Struggling Living comfortably Neither Don't know



NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=9000 voters, August 2025.


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Do you get back what you put in?

A plurality of voters feel they put more in than they get out when it comes to tax, and this grievance is especially high among Reform friendly voters

Generally speaking, with regards to the tax you pay and what you 'get back' from the government in financial support and use of public services, which of these reflects your view?


Total: I feel I pay MORE IN TAX THAN I GET BACK in support or services I get back roughly what I put in Total: I feel I pay LESS IN TAX THAN I GET BACK Don't know



Categories collapsed for ease of visualisation. Full option response: "I feel I get back much more from the government in financial support and use of public services than I pay in tax // I feel I get back slightly more than I pay in tax // I would say I get back roughly the same as I pay in tax // I feel I pay slightly more in tax than I get back // I feel like I pay much more in tax than I get back from the government in financial support and use of public services // Don't know"

NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=9000 voters August 2025.

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


Moving on, we asked people which areas – or policy objectives – they felt needed extra investment – and which they trusted government to spend money well in. Only ‘building up the armed forces’ saw a majority of voters accept that this required extra money and not just efficiency savings, although the NHS, the clean energy transition and cost of living support carried the overall 2024 Labour coalition. In no area, though, did voters overall trust the government to spend extra revenue well.

This was again particularly stark with Labour to Reform voters, with some of the coalitional dilemmas coming to the fore. Potential switchers to Labour – including the small portion of Conservative 2024 voters open to Labour – were more receptive on both of these questions. This is simply a function of their more positive disposition to the government generally.

Do these objectives mostly require extra government investment OR can they be achieved mostly by spending existing money more efficiently?

Net score = % of those saying objective needs extra investment MINUS % of people saying it can be achieved by spending existing budgets more efficiently. How to read this graph: negative score indicates more voters think a objective can be achieved by efficiency, and vice versa.




"Moving on, below is a list of policy goals. If you had to say, do you think achieving these goals requires extra government investment/spending, or do you think it can mostly be achieved by government spending existing money more efficiently?"
Options: Mostly requires extra government investment // Mostly requires spending existing government money more efficiently // Neither // Don't know



Trust in government to spend effectively

This question is strongly impacted by people's overall support for the government. Labour is unpopular right now and this effects trust in effectiveness of spending.

"Net score - % of people saying they would trust government to spend well in this area MINUS those who would not trust it to spend well in this area



"Imagine the UK government raised taxes, including taxes paid by people like you, to fund extra investment in these objectives. Generally speaking, would you trust it to spend it effectively in these areas?" Response options: I would mostly trust government to spend money on this effectively / I would do mostly not trust government to spend money on this effectively / Don't know

NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=9000 adults, August 2025.

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Finding #2: In this environment, voters' overwhelming first preference is that narrow groups at the top - the wealthiest and big business - pay more. They tend to be accepting of whatever the trade-offs that entails. This is a challenge only insofar as many of these taxes may not raise sufficiently large or reliable flows of revenue.

The 'anyone but me' effect

The basic policy dilemma facing the government at this budget is whether to opt for broad-based tax increases - where everyone chips in a small amount -



or narrow increases where small groups pay a large amount extra. Somewhat unsurprisingly, given what we learnt in the previous section, a comfortable majority opt for the latter.

As we can see, the manifesto is also not sacrosanct per se – voters would be fine for the government to breach the manifesto to increase corporation tax, for instance. This is a raw argument about who pays.


Of course, taxing small well-off interests is not risk free – noisy stakeholder groups can dominate the airwaves or compete for voters' sympathy, even if they are relatively well off. But there is a difference between stakeholder noise and vote moving disapproval. The bigger challenge for the government is that these taxes do not tend to raise significant sums of money.


Broad or narrow tax rises?

There is no voter group which would prefer broader tax rises to narrow. As is typical in this kind of research, people's first preference is that the richest pay more.

"Which comes closest to your view?"

- ☐ If government really needs to increase taxes to achieve its goals, it's better that everyone just chips in a little bit
- ☒ If government really needs to increase taxes to achieve its goals, it's better to just tax small groups – like higher earners or the wealthy – more heavily
- ☐ Neither ☐ Don't know






Breaching manifesto put up corporation tax vs respecting manifesto but taxing everyone

The manifesto itself is not sacrosanct – voters will trade it away if it means protecting themselves from tax rises. It's about who pays.

"And at this year's Budget, which of these would you prefer the government do?"


■ The UK government breaks its manifesto commitment to raise corporation tax and income tax on high earners
■ The UK government does not break manifesto commitments, but increases tax slightly on everyone ■ Neither ■ Don't know



Dynata for Persuasion UK, n=3000 UK adults, August 2025.

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Likewise, there are several good reasons for the government not to change fiscal rules to address their challenge, most notably the potentially adverse reaction of bond markets. But voter views on the principle should not be one of those reasons. In principle voters prefer this option to spending cuts or tax rises, even with the risks clearly flagged. However, this likely would not stop them punishing the government for any large-scale market backlash of the sort we saw with Liz Truss' government.





Views on changing fiscal rules vs tax rises or spending cuts

Most voters – especially inside Labour coalition – would not oppose government just changing their day-to-day fiscal rules to alleviate problems. There are many good policy reasons not to do this, but voter opposition to the principle is not one.

"In recent months, the government's attempts to manage public spending have come under pressure. Some people have suggested the government change its "fiscal rules" – the guidelines it uses to manage public spending and borrowing. Supporters say this would give the government more flexibility to respond to uncertain times, and help avoid tax rises or spending cuts. However, critics warn this could damage Britain's reputation with international investors and lead to higher government borrowing costs and debt. If you had to choose, which of these comes closest to your view?"

- I would be ok with the government changing its fiscal rules – even if that meant some risk to its reputation with investors and creditors
- I would NOT be ok with the government changing its fiscal rules – it should stick to its rules and find money in tax rises instead, even if that means raising taxes on ordinary people
- I would NOT be ok with the government changing its fiscal rules – it should stick to its rules and find money in cuts to public spending, even if that means cuts to front-line public services
- Don't know






Attitudes to taxing different interest groups

When thinking about the politics of narrow tax rises on specific groups, it is worth establishing where voters' instinctive loyalty lies. Very often attitudes to individual taxes are downstream of sympathy to individual groups. In addition, policymakers do not need voters to love a policy - simply not to oppose it in high numbers. For this reason, we looked at levels of opposition to taxing different groups in principle.

As we can see below, it is not always the case of groups who are more objectively comfortable being easier targets - even if this is still a broad trend. For instance, anything seen to hit pensioners at large would likely be very unpopular. The same is true of farmers. It is probable that opposition to taxing these groups has increased slightly since the Budget last year and arguments over winter fuel allowance, but they are also groups that voters have always considered relatively modest in income. Petrol car drivers and small businesses also fall into the danger zone, with over 50% of voters opposed to the principle of them paying more tax.


Level of **OPPOSITION** to taxing particular groups

Regarding these groups, in principle, which comes closest to your view? - % shown for 'I would oppose this group paying more tax'



Full response options: 'I would be supportive of these people paying more tax / I would be ok with these people paying more tax / I would oppose these paying more tax / Don't know'. %s exclude don't knows from sample
NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=9000 UK adults.

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If those groups represent the ‘danger zone’ for government policy, easier targets are found at the bottom of the list. These include large banks, oil and gas companies, those with more than £1.2 million in wealth and non-residents who buy property in the UK.


In the middle we find more ‘in play’ groups, politically speaking. These are interest groups where the battle over public sympathy would likely be fairly evenly contested – sympathetic case studies could sway voters against a measure, but clear government framing (eg of these as groups who can afford to pay more) may swing things the other way. Interestingly, domestic flyers, EV drivers and those with pension pots over £300,000 are in this group.

When we move to collect basic support/oppose data on different tax ideas, we can see that the above trends are fairly good predictors of attitudes to individual tax rises.

Net support for possible taxes, list 1 of 2 – among Labour swing groups

Results here really just reflect the fact voters are more relaxed about taxing those at the top than those perceived to be mainstream or more regular voter groups.

"Below are a range of taxes that some have suggested the Labour government could raise at the Budget later this year...to what extent would you support or oppose these tax changes?"



NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=9000 UK adults.


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Net support for possible taxes, list 2 of 2 - Labour swing groups

Net support - all those supporting minus all those opposing.

"Below are a range of taxes that some have suggested the Labour government could raise at the Budget later this year...To what extent would you support or oppose these tax changes?"




NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=9000 UK adults.

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Of course, in the real-world, competitive information environments can drive down - or expose as soft - the support that some policies enjoy in principle. For this reason, we tested six policies in a split-test experiment. Half of the sample were shown just the policy language behind an idea and asked their support in principle. The other half were shown the same policy language but alongside a 'difficult' or sympathetic case study of the kind of person or business who would be impacted by the proposed policy.

Each of these case studies was designed around the kind of 'edge case' that could make policymakers lives' difficult in reality. You can view the full text of these in the annex (3) of this report.

What we find is that support for some of the ideas are softer than others, but that overall changes to CGT, landlord taxation and especially gambling company profits remains robust - or at least in positive territory. Reforms to council tax or switching around national insurance and income tax contributions were particularly susceptible to difficult case studies. Support for road pricing was unaffected but was anyway already in negative territory.



Net support for tax changes with and without sympathetic case studies, among all voters


This was a split-sample test where half the sample were asked their support for the policy in principle, and the other half were presented with a difficult case study – a sympathetic group or type of person who would be hit by the change – and then asked their support for the policy. The texts of the case studies are presented in the annex of this report.

Policy language presented	Net public support: without difficult case study	Net public support: WITH difficult case study presented alongside policy language
"An increase in the tax that gambling companies pay on their profits"	+67%	+51%
"Increasing tax on the income of all landlords so it's taxed at the same rate as income from work. Low income pensioners would be exempted from this tax."	+38%	+18%
"An increase in Capital Gains Tax (CGT) on the wealthiest businesses and wealth owners. This would see them pay more tax on the profit of any asset they sell, so that it is at the same rate as people pay on income from work. At the same time new provisions would be introduced that would reduce the tax on entrepreneurs with risk taking."	+45%	+13%
"Reforming council tax so people in higher value houses pay more council tax. – Those in houses worth over £600k would pay 50% more council tax. – Those in houses worth over £1.5 million would pay three times more council tax. – Everyone else would have their council tax cut by about 3%."	+35%	+2%
"Fuel duty remains frozen, but government will introduce road pricing, where cars pay-per-mile, as tracked by number plate recognition. The price would be 1p per mile for cars and vans, and cost the average driver £70 a year. This would apply to electric vehicles as well as petrol vehicles."	-14%	-14%
"Cut employee National Insurance contributions by 2p, but raise income tax rates by 2p, so that working-age employees' overall tax burden would remain unchanged, while increasing tax on rental, interest, self-employment and pension incomes."	-3%	-25%

"Now imagine the Labour government introduced the following measure in order to fund its priorities, including investment in public services, cost of living schemes and other areas..." n=3000 UK adults, NorStat for Persuasion UK, October 2025. 50% of sample asked on their support for tax policy without a case study, 50% supplied with a sympathetic case study ("Below is an example of someone who would pay more under this policy...").

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Finally, voters are unpersuaded by ideas of a 'millionaire exodus' as a reason not to tax the richest or big business. This is partly because for many it is a moral question, with those groups being seen to have done well in recent decades. But more generally, it speaks to the fact that the average voter's theory of economic growth, such as they have one, tends to be more bottom-up or middle out than it does top down. Rightly or not, they think that it is the spending power of ordinary consumers or the efforts of workers that create economic growth, not entrepreneurs or investors. Arguments about capital flight are thus more of an elite consideration than an immediate electoral one.



Should we tax the rich even if it means they leave?

Along with self-interest, this result is likely partly explained by the fact most voters' theory of growth does not tally with the 'wealth creators' school of thought - it's more bottom up or 'middle out' than trickle down

"Which comes closest to your view?"



NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=1500 adults, August 2025.

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
Finding #3: All that said, *if the choice truly is between failing on key policy areas or breaching manifesto pledges on tax, breaching the manifesto is the least worst option.*

While there is an electoral penalty for manifesto breaching tax rises, it is lower than the penalty for manifestly failing on public services, energy bills and child poverty. This is especially true with Labour 2024 voters. It is also lower than the reward for fixing the NHS specifically.

The previous sections make clear that if the government can achieve its objectives for this Parliament by just raising taxes on narrow groups, namely the rich and wealthy, then it is probably advisable to do so. However, there are reasons to think reality will impinge to make the choices on offer more challenging than this.

Firstly, the fiscal hole identified by the OBR could be even larger than feared. Secondly, the government may wish to not just 'fill in' this hole and go again but to increase investment in priority areas, not least to get some bang for its buck in political terms. In these circumstances, tax rises on narrow groups will likely not be sufficient. This is partly because such taxes - especially those levied on wealth or behaviour - tend to be more uncertain in their revenue flows, but also because they just typically raise less money.

This raises a fundamental policy dilemma. Is it possible for the government to



achieve the priorities of its electoral coalition without raising broad based taxes it ruled out in the manifesto? (National insurance, income tax, VAT, etc). If not, how should it think about the balance of electoral punishment and reward in this unenviable situation? Choosing the least worst option requires robustly testing counter-factuals.

Methodology of experiment


To get at this properly, we used a conjoint approach. Conjoint analysis is a survey based experimental design to observe how people respond when confronted with trade-offs and surface or - reveal - their underlying preferences.

In this instance we recruited over 4,000 UK adults into an experiment. Each was presented with a kind of balance-sheet and asked to imagine that it represented the Labour government's record in 2028, around the time of the next election. This balance sheet was composed of three positive policy achievements and three negative policy failures. They were then asked to what extent they would approve or disapprove of a government that stood on this record, a measure closely correlated with an incumbent party's chances of re-election.

Crucially, every positive and negative achievement was randomised and drawn from a long list (viewable in the annex of this report). In this way, the balance of achievements and failures was different for each survey respondent. One random example seen by one respondent is below.

In the analysis phase, we can then isolate the impact of each individual policy success or failure on the approval of the government (or its net approval - all those approving minus all those disapproving). We do this by observing the approval given to the government only by those respondents exposed to a particular outcome - good and bad - and comparing it to the overall average approval. Any positive or negative difference compared to this baseline can be scored as that outcome's impact. For instance, if a policy outcome is +5 then in the experiment it pushed the government's net approval rating up 5 points compared to the average; if it's -5 then it pushes it down five points.

We need to consider the margin of error here, which is about 3% +/- for voters overall and 6% +/- for Labour voters. The graphs in the next section highlight in blue those outcomes which achieved significant effect sizes, with those in grey.



Imagine that by 2028, the Labour government's record looked like the below.

Government achievements	Government failures/trade-offs
NHS waiting times - both GP and hospital waiting times - in your area have been significantly reduced	Income tax has been increased for everyone, breaking a government manifesto pledge not to do so
The quality of roads in your area has increased , potholes removed	Crime rates have increased
The household bills of the average household have fallen by £200 a year	The number of asylum seekers arriving legally has increased slightly, even though illegal entries on small boats have fallen

On the following scale, to what extent would you approve or disapprove of this record?

Results

As noted, we will analyse results principally by voters overall and then the 2024 Labour coalition.

Looking first at the 'reward' side of the ledger, we can see the strong salience of the NHS to the electorate overall and Labour voters, with falling waiting times adding about 10% to the average approval of the government. Likewise, progress on small boats (+5% overall, +6% with Labour voters), and child poverty (+4%) is rewarded. We can see that among voters overall, there is a small statistically significant reward (+3%) for sticking to manifesto pledges on income tax, NI and VAT.

This is another piece of research, incidentally, which shows the disproportionate salience of climate change to Labour 2024 voters - despite its fall down the issue priorities of voters overall since 2021 and despite hostility to it in some quarters of the right-leaning media. The government meeting its targets on clean energy and energy independence boosted government approval by 7% with Labour voters.




What **POSITIVE DELIVERY OUTCOMES** would currently most impact Government approval ratings ahead of the next election? Results for all voters

The results highlight the **salience of the NHS, small boats and child poverty** - improvements on these issues are disproportionately rewarded by voters at large. Other achievements are not unpopular, just rewarded less on average. Policy outcomes in grey did not have a statistically significant impact (+/- 3%) vs others and should be ignored.


"Imagine that the below is what the Labour government had achieved by the next general election in 2028. On the following scale, to what extent would you approve or disapprove of this record?" - % score represents **change in net government approval** vs the experiment average (conjoint experiment, July 2025).

Positive policy outcome



YouGov for Persuasion UK, July 2025, conjoint experiment, n=4000 nat rep UK adults. Respondents were shown 6 random outcomes of a Labour government, 3 positive and 3 bad, and asked their approval of the government if this was their record. Scores for each policy achieved by comparing resulting government approval rating among those who saw that policy outcome vs the gov't's average approval rating across all respondents. Results above just for positive. This method surfaces relative salience of different outcomes, not overall sympathy to them. Statistical significance @ 90% = +/- 3%.

Persuasion UK




What **POSITIVE DELIVERY OUTCOMES** would currently most impact Government approval ratings ahead of the next election? Results just for **LABOUR 2024 VOTERS**

The NHS again tops the list of salient topics, but we see climate change has more salience than with voters overall. Small boats remains important even to Labour voters. Other achievements are not unpopular, just rewarded less on average.

"Imagine that the below is what the Labour government had achieved by the next general election in 2028. On the following scale, to what extent would you approve or disapprove of this record?" - % score represents **change in net government approval** among Labour 2024 voters vs the experiment average (conjoint experiment, July 2025).

Positive policy outcome




YouGov for Persuasion UK, July 2025, conjoint experiment, n=4000 nat rep UK adults. Respondents were shown 6 random outcomes of a Labour government, 3 positive and 3 bad, and asked their approval of the government if this was their record. Scores for each policy achieved by comparing resulting government approval rating among those who saw that policy outcome vs the gov't average approval rating across all respondents. Results above just for positive. This method surfaces relative salience of different outcomes, not overall sympathy to them. Statistical significance @ 90% = +/- 6% for this sub-group.

Persuasion UK

Turning to the 'punishment' side of things, we find something very important. Among voters overall, there is a statistically significant penalty for breaking the manifesto and raising national insurance (-6%). However, crucially, it is a smaller penalty than is dished out for failing to get on top of rising crime (-10%), energy bills (-7%) or - most strikingly - presiding over a manifest increase in child poverty (-13%).

Among Labour voters overall, we actually don't see any statistically




significant punishment for raising manifesto breaching tax rises, but we do see even more significant punishment for failure on child poverty (-22%), the NHS and crime (-14%) and crime (-10%). This likely reflects the different demographic and values composition of Labour voters to the overall public.

What **NEGATIVE DELIVERY OUTCOMES** would most impact Government approval ratings ahead of the next election? Results for all voters


The results highlight the **risk of failure on child poverty, crime and cost of living**. That said, some penalty is incurred to breaking income tax pledges – albeit its lower than failure on public services and inequality/cost of living. Crime and cost of living likely reflects issue salience, while child poverty is probably more about the basics of what people expect from a Labour government.

"Imagine that the below is what the Labour government had achieved by the next general election in 2028. On the following scale, to what extent would you approve or disapprove of this record?" - % score represents **change in net government approval** vs the experiment average (conjoint experiment, July 2025).

Negative policy outcome



YouGov for Persuasion UK, July 2025, conjoint experiment, n=4000 nat rep UK adults. Respondents were shown 6 random outcomes of a Labour government, 3 positive and 3 bad, and asked their approval of the government if this was their record. Scores for each policy achieved by comparing resulting government approval rating among those who saw that policy outcome vs the govt's average approval rating across all respondents. Results above just for negative. This method surfaces relative salience of different outcomes, not overall sympathy to them. Statistical significance @ 90% = +/- 3%.




What **NEGATIVE DELIVERY OUTCOMES** would currently most impact Government approval ratings ahead of the next election? Results just for **LABOUR 2024 VOTERS**

Failure on child poverty and the NHS are punished most strongly by Labour 2024 voters, along with crime and energy bills. Interestingly, no statistically meaningful punishment was incurred with this group overall for raising income taxes.

*Imagine that the below is what the Labour government had achieved by the next general election in 2028. On the following scale, to what extent would you approve or disapprove of this record? - % score represents change in net government approval among Labour 2024 voters vs the experiment average (conjoint experiment, July 2025).

Negative policy outcome




YouGov for Persuasion UK, July 2025, conjoint experiment, n=4000 nat rep UK adults. Respondents were shown 6 random outcomes of a Labour government, 3 positive and 3 bad, and asked their approval of the government if this was their record. Scores for each policy achieved by comparing resulting government approval rating among those who saw that policy outcome vs the govt's average approval rating across all respondents. Results above just for negative. This method surfaces relative salience of different outcomes, not overall sympathy to them. Statistical significance @ 90% = +/- 6% for this sub-group.

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Isolating results just for 'Reform curious Labour voters' (those who have gone from Labour to Reform or are open to doing so) is challenging given small sample sizes and large margins of error. However, even taking these into account we see a similar picture as with voters overall. These successes were rewarded:

- NHS waiting lists significantly reduced (+18% increase in average Govt approval among this group)
- Easier to access good quality social care (+12%)



- Small boats crossing the channel significantly decreased (+9%)

And these failures were punished:

- Child poverty has increased (-15%)
- Overall legal migration to the UK is higher (-14%)
- NHS waiting lists have not been reduced (-12%)
- Crime has increased (-12%)
- Income tax has been increased, breaching manifesto commitment (-11%).

The higher punishment meted out for tax rises by these voters compared to the overall Labour 2024 coalition is logical when you consider what we learnt in the previous sections of this research, namely Labour/Reform voters lower levels of trust and income. That said, even with these voters, the punishment here is still lower than for failing on other areas or indeed the reward for succeeding on the NHS and social care.

How to interpret this experiment - and how not to

Demonstrably, this is not a flawless experiment. It is simply not possible to perfectly replicate the information environment of 2028 or the years preceding it, while priorities of voters wax and wane over time also. The results above should therefore be interpreted with humility.

However, even with those caveats, they do tell a fairly clear picture of underlying voter preferences. Namely, that the punishment for failure on the public realm is higher than the punishment for raising taxes, even ones the government said they would not raise.

These results may surprise some people, and the salience of things like child poverty even more so. But in many ways they are entirely logical. It is often said in life that 'happiness equals reality minus expectations' and it's likely that what we are dealing with here is something similar. Fixing the public realm - NHS, crime and so on - are central to what people expect of Labour governments, so failure on them is more stark.



Likewise, even if child poverty is not every voters number one priority, manifestly failing on it offends people's sense of what Labour governments are for.

While voters do not like tax rises, it is more in keeping with what they expect from a Labour government, even if that is negatively considered.

Things like re-establishing a reputation for economic competence and restraint on tax were an important part of making the Labour brand hygienic again in the last parliament - but these can be considered 'table stakes'. The shape of Labour's electoral mandate runs through the UK's crumbling public realm and fraying social contract.

This raises some fundamental policy questions for the government ahead of the Budget:

- How much extra investment - if any - is required to achieve success, or avoid obvious failure, in public services, energy bills/cost of living and child poverty?
- Can that amount be raised from non-manifesto breaching tax rises?
- How quickly will investment in these areas drive a large enough improvement to be noticed by voters?

It is possible that the sums involved in answering the first of these questions are simply too large to be in any way politically sustainable. Likewise, it may also be possible that success on for instance on the NHS or child poverty does not run through extra investment. In those circumstances, the government would be wise to avoid unnecessary tax rises.

However, if large amounts of extra investment is required to drive tangible improvement in the aforementioned areas, or at least avoid failure, then breaching the manifesto is the least worst option.

There is also risk in being too cautious even in that circumstance. For instance, probably the worst place to be in would be to raise enough tax to upset voters but not enough to drive any kind of improvement in the things they will punish and reward government for come the next election. Arguably if the government is going to do this, it should do it properly, raising enough cash to



drive short term retail offers (eg on energy bills) and long term improvements in public services.

Finding #4: In the short term, the best strategic communications approach for selling manifesto breaching tax rises probably combines themes of fairness - those at the top being asked for most - with a renewed focus on cost of living, for example giving something back in the short term through energy bill discounts.

Finding #5: However, this area raises coalitional dilemmas for Labour. While some Labour to Reform switchers can be persuaded, overall they are the most difficult group to carry. Other groups - such as soft Conservatives or Greens - may need to be brought into the Labour coalition to replace those who tax rises alienate.


It is clear that cost of living pressures and low trust make manifesto breaching tax rises a hard sell. However, if they are required, there is a coalition of sorts that may be willing to reluctantly accept them - but much will depend on how confidently they are sold.

To start with, we can see that opinion in this area is fairly soft. While previous sections of this research show large portions of voters unwilling to pay more tax themselves, it is possible to generate majorities in favour of this with different question framings. For instance, below are two such framings - albeit both in different ways predicated on efficacy.

Openness to paying more tax if...

Opinion in this area is fairly pliable. There are framings which can generate pluralities of support for breaching the manifesto. But again they are conditional on trust in government, which is low right now. Even here, we see the opinion of Labour/Reform switchers and financial strugglers to be quite sticky.

"Which comes closest to your view?"






Forcing a choice on change vs respecting tax promises

Though most voters would obviously prefer Labour achieves both, forced to choose a plurality choose change – but again we see sharp differences across the coalition (or potential coalition)

"Which comes closest to your view?"



NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=1500 adults, August 2025.

Persuasion UK


In addition, about 60% of all voters, and 47% of Labour 2024 voters, already consider the government to have broken its manifesto promises on tax. Arguably, this may soften the impact of a breach itself.

Has the government kept or broken its pledges on tax?

Questions like this can sometimes be partly 'downstream' of wider attitudes to government. That said, the fact a plurality of Labour voters already think the Govt has breached manifesto commitments on tax is striking.

"Which of these comes closest to your view?"

- Up to now, the government has KEPT PLEDGES it made in its manifesto relating to tax
- The government has ALREADY BROKEN PLEDGES it made in its manifesto relating to tax
- Don't know



NorStat for Persuasion UK, n=9000 adults.

Persuasion UK



None of this is to say that selling personal tax rises is easy or desirable, especially when the government itself enjoys low approval ratings and cost of living is so salient. But it does highlight that opinion on this topic, like any other, is fairly fungible and responsive to different frames. That said, we can see above that some groups are harder to persuade than others, so coalitional choices matter here. We explore all this more in the below experiment.

Competitive message testing experiment: methodology

For this we used competitive frame testing or paired statement testing. Over 9,000 UK adults were presented with two arguments. On the left hand side was a random pro-tax rise message, and on the right hand side they saw a random anti-tax rise message. Both of these were drawn at random from the tables below.

Each respondent was asked the question:

“On the left hand side is an argument some people have made FOR raising taxes, including taxes that ordinary people pay and including those which break the government’s manifesto commitments. On the right is an argument AGAINST raising taxes in this way.

If you had to say, which of these do you find most convincing?”

In the analysis phase we see how each pro-message performed against an average anti message. The percentages you’ll see relate to how often a respondent chose the pro side of the argument when exposed to this message.






Table of pro messages

Cost of living support Most people need help with the cost of living. The government can't stop every price rise, it could fund cheaper energy bills and help with childcare for middle and low earners.	Regeneration Too many towns feel empty and neglected. And when parts of our country don't grow, the whole economy suffers. If the government raised more in tax, we could revive high streets, bring new businesses to neglected parts of the country, and bring communities back to life.
Fairness For too long, those at the top have got away without paying their fair share in tax, while hoarding wealth and power. As the government seeks to fix Britain, everyone might need to chip in a bit - but those at the top need to be taxed a lot more so everyone else can benefit.	The world has changed / international instability The world has changed in the last 12 months and is even more uncertain. Trump's tariffs are disrupting the global economy, and governments everywhere are feeling the hit. We need to accept things beyond our control have changed — and raise more tax to meet the challenge.
Efficiency In the last year the government has made difficult decisions to save taxpayer money in the welfare system and the civil service. With this leaner operation, it's now fairer to raise more in taxes - people can be confident it will be spent better.	Military / defence - Russian aggression The world is more dangerous than it's been in decades. We have a land war in Europe. To help defend against Russian aggression, Britain must rebuild its armed forces and invest in national security — even if it means higher taxes.



14 years of under-investment in public services After 14 years of under-investment, our services are falling apart — crumbling schools, 5-hour A&E waits, broken transport and social care systems. A small top-up won't fix this. If the government raised more tax, we could properly fund services and transform things for good - not just patch them	Future generations We have to start thinking about future generations and the country we are handing down to them. Our children and grandchildren deserve a country with a properly funded NHS, functioning infrastructure - a country where things aren't just patched up.
Liz Truss / £22bn black hole Liz Truss reckless mini-budget triggered a spike in borrowing costs for the government - while the Sunak government left a £22bn black hole in the finances and public services on their knees. The government needs to raise taxes to plug these gaps.	Honesty The truth is: if we want decent public services, we all need to chip in a bit more. Politicians can't keep pretending everything can be fixed without raising taxes. It's time to level with people.
Immigration The government's policies will reduce immigration, which will reduce economic growth and lower tax receipts. We need to raise more in taxes to plug this gap. But it's a price worth paying for lower immigration.	Economic growth Britain's economy is flatlining - we need growth. For that, we need to invest in the industries, infrastructure and skills that create prosperity. That has to be paid for with taxes - but it will pay off in the end.
Headroom For years, governments have run the public finances with very little buffer for unforeseen circumstances. This needs to stop. We must increase our reserves in order to be prepared for an emergency when we need the money.	



Anti messages tested

Cost of living People are already under huge financial pressure from rising prices, mortgages, and bills. The last thing families need is even higher taxes. Instead of asking ordinary people to pay more, the government should focus on easing the cost of living and helping people stay afloat.	Tax the rich instead There's no shortage of money in Britain — it's just concentrated at the top. Instead of raising taxes on ordinary workers, the government should go after big corporations, tax avoiders, and the ultra-wealthy who've been getting away with it for years.
Government waste Why should we hand over more of our money when the government constantly wastes what it already has? From overpriced contracts to failed IT systems, billions are lost every year. Before demanding higher taxes, they should prove they can spend what they've got properly.	Hurts the economy Raising taxes pulls money out of people's pockets and weakens spending, it also hurts businesses. That risks slowing down the economy just when it needs to grow. If we want better public services, we should focus on creating growth — not taxing working people even harder.
Middle-class squeeze Every time taxes go up, it's the middle that gets hit — not the rich, not those on benefits, but working people who earn just enough to miss out on support. Once again, it's those in the middle who are being squeezed hardest.	Asylum hotels Increased immigration and asylum are the reason the government has lost control of its finances - if we pay more tax it will only go on more hotels for asylum seekers.
Millionaire exodus Millionaires and businesses are leaving the UK. Last year they increased shocks and it was terrible for businesses. Raising taxes again would be chasing the wealth creators out of the country.	Record tax rates Taxes are the highest they've been since the 1960s. We are already taxing too much in the UK, we can't increase them any further.



Results of message testing experiment


Starting with the pro-messages, we can see that no message beats the anti message overall – testament to the fact this is a difficult sell. However, several frames come close or fight things to a draw.

Frame testing results – manifesto breaching tax rises

Among the population at large, only 'fairness' fights things to a draw – most pro-tax messages lose out to a typical anti message. However, there is more encouragement inside the Labour (or potential Labour) coalition. Future generations and cost of living also perform well, while military/defence does well with potential Con switchers to Labour.

"On the left hand side is an argument some people have made FOR raising taxes, including taxes that ordinary people pay and including those which break the government's manifesto commitments. On the right is an argument AGAINST raising taxes in this way. If you had to say, which of these do you find most convincing?"

■ % supporting PRO-tax message when this message was seen ■ % supporting ANTI tax message when this message was seen ■ % Don't know




NorStat for Persuasion U.K., n=9000 UK adults August 2025. Participants were shown one random pro-tax message alongside one random anti-tax message, and asked which they found most convincing. Graph shows % of time each pro/anti message was chosen when each pro message was displayed.

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More importantly, as we look across different voter groups, you start to see that those groups more open to Labour are more sellable on the subject, as is the overall 2024 Labour coalition.

Overall, the most successful messages in this respect are **fairness** (emphasising that everyone is chipping in but the richest will pay the most), a long term message around **restoring public services for future generations** and a short-term one around funding short-term **cost of living support** (tax revenue can be used to fund energy bill discounts and childcare expansion).

However, it's notable that the pool of Conservatives open to switching to Labour are particularly persuaded by the argument on the **need to re-arm against the threat to Russia**.



Labour to Reform voters are not won round overall by any message, reflecting their stickier or more hostile disposition to the government, although cost of living and public services messages come reasonably close.


Turning to the best performing anti messages, we can see that a straightforward message about how voters cannot afford tax rises – and how the government cannot be trusted to spend the money well – are the best performing. Although ‘asylum hotels’ (this money will just be spent on asylum hotels) does notably well with Labour/Reform switchers.

Frame testing results - manifesto breaching tax rises - best anti messages

Cost of living squeeze works best, though ‘asylum hotels’ works best with Lab/Reform switchers and ‘tax the rich instead’ with Labour left defectors. Potential Con switchers to Lab are susceptible to ‘middle class always get hurt most’ argument.

"On the left hand side is an argument some people have made FOR raising taxes, including taxes that ordinary people pay and including those which break the government's manifesto commitments. On the right is an argument AGAINST raising taxes in this way. If you had to say, which of these do you find most convincing?"

■ Anti-tax message % ■ Pro-tax message % □ Don't know %



NorStat for Persuasion U.K, n=9000 UK adults August 2025. Participants were shown one random pro-tax message alongside one random anti-tax message, and asked which they found most convincing. Graph shows % of time each pro/anti message was chosen when each pro message was displayed.



Communications take-aways

Bearing all this in mind, probably the best approach for selling manifesto tax rises is to do the following:


- Make a positive argument about the need for everyone to contribute something to the re-building of the country, but emphasise that those at the top will pay most. This latter point is basic hygiene for being heard.



- Use this event to start a renewed focus on the cost of living, giving some money back to voters in the form of energy bill discounts or expanded childcare - in an attempt to at least neutralise opposition attacks on this territory. In designing these, breadth of support is more important than depth; that is, these interventions should be designed to go fairly far up the income scale and not just focus on the poorest, in order to enable most voters to feel they have got something back in the short term.

For opponents of tax rises, they simply have to punch existing bruises around cost of living and voters being asked to pay more into a system they already feel they don't get much out of.


While public opinion on this topic is malleable, it is clear that it is not entirely united. In what is fast becoming a very balkanised electorate, some groups are more persuadable than others. For both proponents and opponents of tax rises, this requires a sharp focus on what coalition is being spoken to and why.



Annex

1. Size of Labour swing groups, nationally and in marginals.

Switcher groups as % of population, nationally and in swing seats




Latest figures as of early September 2025 with YouGov, n=4000 voters for Persuasion UK/LCOEF.

Persuasion UK


2. All policies tested in policy outcomes conjoint.

Positive outcomes tested
A1: NHS waiting times - both GP and hospital waiting times - in your area have been significantly reduced
A2: The quality of roads in your area has increased, potholes removed
A3. It's easier for older people to access good quality professional social care
A4. Child poverty has fallen
A5. Access to free childcare has been increased
A6. Energy bills have fallen compared to 2025
A7. The minimum wage and workers rights have been strengthened
A8. Housing prices and private rents have become slightly more affordable
A9. Average wages have increased slightly in real terms



A10. The number of asylum seekers crossing the channel illegally on ‘small boats’ has significantly decreased
A11. Government debt and deficits have fallen
A12. Public transport costs (eg bus, train fares) have fallen
A13. Income tax, national insurance and VAT have not been increased, meeting manifesto commitments {mutually exclusive with B1, B2, B12}
A14. Rates of crime have fallen
A15. The government has met its targets on climate change targets and energy independence after big expansion in UK-produced renewable energy
A16. There is a dedicated police officer for every street in the country
A17 There is a mental wellness worker in every school
A18 The household bills of the average household has fallen by £200 a year

Negative outcomes tested
B1. Income tax has been increased for everyone, breaking a government manifesto pledge not to do so
B2. National insurance tax has been increased for everyone in work, breaking a government manifesto pledge not to do so
B3. Corporation tax has been raised on business profits, breaking a manifesto pledge not to do so
B4. Income tax thresholds have remained frozen since 2023, more quickly bringing more people into higher tax bands as their wage rises
B5. Tax free personal allowance has been decreased, slightly increasing taxes on everyone who pays income tax
B6. The number of asylum seekers arriving legally has increased slightly, even though illegal entries on small boats have fallen
B7. Energy bills have increased {mutually exclusive with A6}
B8. NHS waiting times – GP and hospital – in your area are still high and have not significantly fallen {mutually exclusive with A1}
B9. Government debt and deficits are higher, with government not meeting its fiscal rules {mutually exclusive with A11}
B10. Overall legal migration to the UK is higher than before
B11. Taxes on wealthy people have increased, leading to reports of some leaving the country



B12. The headline rate of VAT has been increased, breaking a government manifesto pledge not to do so

B13. Child poverty has increased {mutually exclusive with A4}

B14. Crime rates have increased {mutually exclusive with A14}

B15. The government has missed its climate change targets, after u-turning on several key environmental commitments {mutually exclusive with A15}

B16. Better-off pensioners are taxed more than before

3. Difficult case studies for policy split-test experiment

Imagine the Labour government introduced the following measures in order to fund its priorities, including investment in public services, cost of living schemes and other areas.

a. Fuel duty

Fuel duty remains frozen, but government will introduce road pricing, where cars pay-per-mile, as tracked by number plate recognition. The price would be 1p per mile for cars and vans., and cost the average driver £70 a year. This would apply to electric vehicles as well as petrol vehicles.

Below is an example of someone who would pay more tax under this policy:

Paul, a 47-year-old commuter who recently made the switch from petrol car to electric car after encouragement from the government. Paul needs to drive 15,000 miles a year for work. As a result, he will now pay £150 extra a year in tax whereas before he paid none, since electric car drivers do not use petrol so don't pay petrol duty.

To what extent, if at all, would you support or oppose the policy of introducing road pricing?

b. Council tax reform

Reforming council tax so people in higher value houses pay more council tax.



- *Those in houses worth over £600k would pay 50% more council tax.*
- *Those in houses worth over £1.5 million would pay three times more council tax.*
- *Everyone else would have their council tax cut by about 3%*

Below is an example of someone who would pay more tax under this policy:

- *Kate, 69, a pensioner who has no income other than a modest/typical pension, but who lives in a house worth over £600k – the house was only worth £25,000 when she and her late husband bought it when they were young, but the house is located in an area where house prices have increased dramatically in recent decades. Under this proposal they pay 50% more council tax.*

To what extent, if at all, would you support or oppose the policy of increasing council tax on wealthier households?

c. *Landlord taxation*

Increasing tax on the income of all landlords so it's taxed at the same rate as income from work. Low income pensioners would be exempted from this tax.

Below is an example of someone who would pay more tax under this policy:

- *Dave, 72, a pensioner who draws a modest income from a pension, but also has an income from renting out a house they used to live in. He will now pay more tax on his income under this policy.*

To what extent, if at all, would you support or oppose this policy?

d. *Capital Gains Tax changes*

An increase in Capital Gains Tax (CGT) on the wealthiest businesses and wealth owners. This would see them pay more tax on the profit of any asset they sell, so that it is at the same rate as people pay on income from work.

Below is an example of someone who would pay more tax under this policy:

- *Six years ago, Sam founded a small tech firm in Manchester helping local*



businesses manage deliveries. He paid himself little, reinvesting everything to grow the team. Now the company has been bought for £2 million — his first real payoff. Under the proposed CGT reform, most of that gain would be taxed like income from work, rather than as a capital reward. This means founders like Sam could see their years of risk and effort taxed much more heavily, at the same rate as regular employees.

To what extent, if at all, would you support or oppose the policy of increasing tax on the windfall profits of wealthy asset owners?

e. Gambling tax

- An increase in the tax that gambling companies pay on their profits

Below is an example of someone who would pay more under this policy:

Paul, 38, who likes the occasional bet on the horseracing, will now face lower odds/lower payouts on bets than before as gambling companies pass on costs of the extra tax on their profits to customers.

To what extent, if at all, would you support or oppose the policy of increasing taxation on gambling company profits?

f. NIC/Income tax switch

Cut employee National Insurance contributions by 2p, and raise income tax rates by 2p, so that working-age employees' overall tax burden would remain unchanged, while increasing tax on rental, interest, self-employment and pension incomes. (This swap is projected to raise about £6 billion a year.)

Below is an example of someone who would pay more under this policy:

Sheila worked in the NHS for over 40 years and now lives on her state pension, a small private pension, and rent from a lodger. She supports fair taxation to fund public services but feels anxious about the government's plan to raise income tax while cutting National Insurance. Since her pension and rental income would be taxed more, Sheila worries about coping with rising living costs.

To what extent, if at all, would you support or oppose this policy?

