





Willing the ends but not the means?

Exploring shifting public opinion on
Brexit, Rejoin and closer UK-EU relations

Author: Steve Akehurst with additional analysis by Tom Pruchnow



 Persuasion UK
Convergent.



Acknowledgments

Thank you to the team at IPPR for inputting into this research, notably Tazu Walden, Mihir Sharma, Rosie Okumbe and Laura Chappell. Thanks also to Fintan Smith and Dylan Spielman at Convergent Opinion for their partnership and fieldwork. Finally, thank you to Tom Prater for designing this report especially at short notice.



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
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
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Executive summary





Ten years on from the UK's vote to leave the European Union, this report seeks to examine shifts in public attitudes on the topic. In particular, we are interested in how robust apparent support for Rejoin or a much closer economic relationship are within the electorate. We find the following:

- **Brexit is now unambiguously viewed negatively** by a majority of UK voters. Negativity is strongest in the areas of travel (Brexit is seen to have hurt UK citizens ability to move freely around the EU) and the economy (it is seen to have severely hindered small businesses ability to thrive and grow). None of the pledges of the Leave campaign are seen to have been fully delivered.
- In this context, most polls show large **headline support for Rejoin** of around 64-36%. **Demographic churn** has been an important part of this. In England and Wales we estimate that about forty percent of the fall in total support for Leave/Stay Out since 2016 is accounted for by churn in the electorate (older 'Stay Out' inclined voters dying and younger 'Rejoin' sympathisers coming of age). The remainder is composed of 2016 voters who have, on paper at least, changed their mind on the matter.
- However, our stress testing experiments find that **support for Rejoin is a fair bit softer than headline polling would suggest**, once people are exposed to some of the trade-offs, arguments and hostile opposition framings likely to be involved. **Average headline support for Rejoin after stress testing is more like 52-48%, notably lower than the 64-36% we see in topline public polling.** This is not fatal for Rejoin, the argument remains winnable and this is just an experiment, but it does suggest vulnerability worth being aware of. Stress-tested support for a closer economic relationship - for instance involving the customs union - averaged 58-42%, making it the slightly more comfortable of the two paths tested.
 - Overall, it is striking that stress testing Rejoin seems to wash away or reverse any persuasion effects among Leave 2016 voters, leaving Rejoin as a platform reliant on favourable demographic trends to take it to 52%.
- Our reflection overall is that if voters were offered the chance to rejoin the EU tomorrow - immediately - on precisely the same terms as before, there would likely be a majority for it. But it is the distance between that and the messy reality which creates softness in opinion.
- Specifically, advocates of Rejoin would have to eliminate or neutralise the following factors we found in our work:
 - Any commitment to **the Euro**, however theoretical, sinks Rejoin as a proposition well below majority support, knocking 7-8 percentage points in both stress testing experiments. This happens even if people also see factual counter-arguments about it. It must be taken off the table from the start to even get a hearing.
 - At a time of constrained budgets, hostile media attacks on **budget payments to the EU** alone knocked ~9 points off Rejoin as a proposition.
 - Opposition to **exiting post-Brexit trade deals** was also surprisingly salient among waverers in this area, which is a challenge for the Closer Relationship (eg customs union) proposition too. This may speak to an attachment to the 'sunk costs' of Brexit among voters.



- Also under-rated is **voter exhaustion** with the issue. In our experiments, any negotiation process absorbing more than 12-18 months of government time hurt the pro-EU position markedly.
- EU citizens enjoying **freedom of movement to the UK** is no longer the winning argument for opponents of close UK-EU relations that it was in 2016. When framed neutrally to voters, it does not reduce support for Rejoin. However, opposition attacks on it do still damage the Rejoin cause somewhat. This suggests there is a softness in opinion here even if it is not as potent as back in 2016.
- On the other hand, there are several factors pulling people towards Rejoin or a closer relationship which advocates of these positions can leverage – and which opponents of UK-EU integration or Rejoin should be aware of. These are:
 - The **economy** – and in particular small business – is seen to have suffered under Brexit. The single market and customs union add several points on to the support of any future EU-UK relationship, which regulatory obligations in return do not wash away.
 - Voters have noticed **long border queues when travelling to the EU** – it is something tangible closely associated with Brexit and fixing it not only adds support for Rejoin, but makes the politics of freedom of movement more contested than before.
 - Finally, **defence and security** emerges as a major pull factor for Rejoin and closer UK-EU relations generally. The chaotic Presidency of Donald Trump has underlined that the US is no longer a reliable partner to the UK in a dangerous world, creating an openness to a push towards integration with the EU as a response.
- Overall, Rejoin advocates can use the perceived failure of Brexit to their advantage, especially on the economy and travel, but need to seek to replicate the terms of previous membership and minimise government focus on the issue to under eighteen months. Anti-EU advocates can no longer rely on freedom of movement as an open-and-shut opposition argument; their best case tends to run through the ‘faff factor’ and arguments of priority. In the immediate future, a closer economic relationship – for instance through the customs union – may be a less polarising forward step.



Research objectives and methodology

Terms of reference

Throughout this report we use the phrase ‘Rejoin’ to mean rejoining the European Union as a full member. We refer to ‘Closer Relationship’ as a scenario where the UK stays outside of the EU but has a much closer economic relationship, *including the ceding of significant sovereignty in exchange for certain benefits (eg customs union)*.

What we wanted to find out

This report seeks to answer three foundational questions:

- **RQ1:** What are baseline levels of public support on the different possible outcomes to a renegotiated UK-EU relationship, in particular on different variants of rejoin and closer relationship? Where are these voters’ ‘red lines’, in principle?
- **RQ2:** How do top line attitudes change – if at all – when voters are exposed to aggressive attack messages from opponents of a renegotiated deal?
- **RQ3:** What messages and communications approach are best for selling a closer relationship with the EU and the trade-offs that may involve? What messages and communications approaches most undermine support?

What we did

We conducted the following research between June and August 2026:

- Two one-hour focus groups held with swing voters. The first was held with voters open to *both* Rejoin and Stay Out. The second was held with a specific group of ‘Reform curious Labour voters’ (voted Labour in 2024 but currently scoring 6+ out of 10 on willingness to vote Reform at the next general election). These were held in early June 2026.
- A baseline survey of over 3,000 UK voters fielded between 11th–15th June via Convergent Opinion. This was used to establish top line attitudes to both Brexit and Rejoin in particular.
- Innovative demographic analysis conducted by Tom Pruchnow on how demographic trends – that is, older voters dying and new ones entering the electorate – have moved baseline support for Rejoin and Stay Out, compared to persuasion effects. A fuller note on how this was conducted can be found on the Persuasion UK website under the research entry for this report.
- A conjoint/vignette experiment, the first of our stress testing experiments, conducted 25th–30th June 2026 through Convergent Opinion. This exposed 2,907 people – neutrally – to the range of possible benefits, obligations and negotiating times of both Rejoin and Closer



Relationship. It also exposes people to some of the likely arguments for and against by supporters and opponents of both outcomes. This is explained more fully in Section 3 and the full details of everything that is seen are in Annex A.

- A ‘mock social media feed’ experiment with 11,000 UK voters, the second of our stress testing experiments, conducted in August 2026 through Convergent Opinion. This puts participants into a simulated social media feed where they can scroll past content both unrelated and related to Brexit. Crucially, in the mix are different media headlines – or representations – of different aspects of Rejoin or Closer Relationship. Some of these headlines are *bad faith negative attacks* (as would likely come from more right-leaning media outlets), some are *positive representations* (as would come from more left-leaning media outlets) and some are neutral or factual representations (as would likely come from the BBC, for instance). After spending time in this environment, participants are invited to take a survey and we observe the difference of forced exposure to different media representations on their attitudes to Rejoin and Closer Relationship, compared to a control group.



Results

Section 1: public attitudes to Brexit so far

Across both the baseline survey and our focus groups, one result is reasonably unambiguous: most voters in the UK think Brexit has so far been a bad thing for the country overall, or at least they perceive it negatively.


By a margin of 58-18%, voters overall feel leaving the European Union has been negative for the UK overall, with the remainder neutral or unsure. This increases to 61% in the areas of economy and travel, two key weaknesses for the project. 60% of Leave voters think it has been bad for immigration. Only in the area of sovereignty is overall opinion relatively divided, though the fraction thinking it has been positive only reaches 24% of voters.

Perceived impact of Brexit

Both Leave and Remain voters are united in their view on the negative impact of Brexit so far, except on the issue of sovereignty. This carries across every swing group.

"This year marks 10 years since the UK voted to leave the European Union in June 2016. What impact, if any, would you say Brexit has had on these things?"

Positive Neither Negative Don't know



Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3039 UK voters, nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026. Original scale was 5 point ("large positive impact, small positive impact, etc") but collapsed for ease of visualisation.

 Persuasion UK


Furthermore, key pledges of the Vote Leave campaign are seen to be undelivered, notably "an extra £350 million a week for the NHS" and lower immigration and more control over it. More people also think cutting red tape on small business has not been delivered than has been. The main deliverables are seen to be freedom from European Courts, new trade deals and an end to budget payments to the EU.



Have Vote Leave campaign promises been delivered?

"Below are some pledges made by those campaigning for the UK to leave the EU in 2016. Overall, to what extent if at all do you believe each of the following to have come true / been delivered since 2016?"


- Delivered (completely/mostly)
- Partially delivered
- Not delivered at all
- Don't know



Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3039 UK voters, nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026. =



The only meaningful caveat to all of this is it remains relatively low salience. At the time of writing, only 13% consider the UK's relationship with the EU to be a top 3 issue facing the country. When probed specifically on the importance of this issue to them, around 26% of voters say it is either one of the most important issues to them or the most important, with a plurality saying it matters but other issues are more important right now. Importance is higher with Labour/Green curious swing voters and lowest with Reform 2024 voters, as we might expect.



Brexit as a top issue: salience has collapsed since 2019 (YouGov tracker data)

% of Britons naming "Britain leaving the EU" among the most important issues facing the country. "Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the country at this time? Please tick up to three." Peak 75% in September 2019; 13% at the end of September 2026.



Source: Source: YouGov, The most important issues facing the country tracker, GB adults, Feb 2011 - Sep 2026.


 Persuasion UK



Issue importance: Brexit and UK-EU relations

Brexit is disproportionately important to Green curious Labour voters, and in Scotland, but overall the issue is low-ish importance right now. That does not mean, however, that importance couldn't be catalysed by events or political competition on the issue.

"And how important to you, if at all, is your opinion on Brexit and the UK's relationship with the EU?"



Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3039 UK voters, nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026

 Persuasion UK

Nevertheless, a clear majority now reflexively say they think rejoining the EU would have an overall positive impact on the UK.




Perceived impact of Rejoining the EU

Generally speaking, people think issues made worse by Brexit will be improved by Rejoin, although it is more equivocal in the case of immigration

"And what difference, if at all, do you think rejoining the EU would have on these things in reality?"

■ Positive ■ Neither ■ Negative ■ Don't know



Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3039 UK voters, nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026. Original scale was 5 point ("large positive impact, small positive impact, etc") but collapsed for ease of visualisation.

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All of this conditions attitudes to Rejoin and Closer Relationship, as we are about to see.



Section 2: baseline attitudes towards Rejoin and demographic trends underpinning this

The previous section helps us understand why most public polling now shows a majority of voters supportive of rejoining the European Union. In addition, we can add to this innovative demographic analysis looking at how deaths among older voters and younger voters entering voting age has changed things too.

Top line attitudes


If we look at it on a raw vote basis – including don't knows and abstainers – support for rejoining sits at 52%, with Stay Out on 29%. If we look at it on a headline basis, removing don't knows and abstentions to get to what the result would be if a referendum were held tomorrow, those figures are 64% Join and 36% Stay Out.

While there is a partisan split in these attitudes – with core Reform 2024 voters and most Conservative 2024 voters preferring to Stay Out, the governing Labour electoral coalition is reasonably united, with even Reform curious Labour voters breaking 60:40 for Rejoin. Changing the question to 'rejoining tomorrow on previous terms', and so making the matter more concrete, we see a shift of don't knows and abstainers into Stay Out – with Labour/Reform swing voters notably now more divided – but still a comfortable majority overall.



Raw voting intent: Rejoin vs Stay Out, including don't knows and will not vote

"Imagine there was a referendum tomorrow on whether the UK should rejoin the European Union or stay out. How would you vote?"




Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3039 UK voters, nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026

 Persuasion UK



Headline second ref vote: Rejoin vs Stay Out, excluding don't knows and would not vote

"Imagine there was a referendum tomorrow on whether the UK should rejoin the European Union or stay out. How would you vote?"




Source: Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3,039 UK voters (2,417 expressing a view), nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026 • Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3039 UK voters, nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026

 Persuasion UK


Top-line support for rejoin (on previous terms)

"Imagine that the UK could rejoin the European Union tomorrow on the exact same terms as those it had before it left, without any negotiation period. Should the UK rejoin, or stay out?"



Source: Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3,039 UK voters, nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026


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
Constituency polling over the summer in Makerfield, the Prime Minister’s seat, found that even in this heavily 2016 Leave voting constituency, opinion now favoured Rejoin.

Headline attitudes to UK and the EU in Makerfield constituency: 2026 vs 2016 vote

2026 constituency poll: Makerfield



2016 vote: Makerfield




Constituency polled by Survation for Persuasion UK and others, n=518 adults in Makerfield, 26th May - 1st June. "If there were a referendum tomorrow on the UK’s membership in the European Union, how do you think you would vote?". Figures show respondents likely to vote, weighted by likelihood to vote, with undecideds and refused removed. 2016 vote for Makerfield (new boundaries) is based on estimates by Dr Chris Hanretty.

Looking at the cross-breaks on such attitudes nationally, the key drivers tend to be partisanship and age rather than class or education per se. The split on age in particular holds across electoral coalitions.



Rejoin support by age, top line polling

% who would vote to rejoin the EU "on previous terms, tomorrow". Support is essentially flat from 18 to 64-under-45s and the middle-aged look alike - then falls off a cliff at retirement age.



Source: Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, 11th-15th June 2026, n=3,039 UK adults. Base includes don't knows.


Persuasion UK

Age splits on Europe tend to cut across political coalitions

Young voters tend to be more pro-EU regardless of their party/values alignment - even if party and values alignment still does matter


% who would vote to rejoin the EU "on previous terms, tomorrow", by age within 2024 vote.

Age group ● 18-44 ● 45-64 ● 65+



Source: Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, 11th-15th June 2026, n=3,039 UK adults. Base includes don't knows.

Persuasion UK



This would appear to be a significant shift in attitudes since 2016, one that runs ahead of Westminster perceptions of opinion.

Demographic analysis: how much of the movement since 2016 is persuasion and how much is ‘births and deaths’ among the electorate?

Since 2016, approximately 13.5 percentage points has been lost from the ‘Leave/Stay Out’ cause in England and Wales, at least according to topline polling – from comparing the 2016 result to what polls suggest it would be if a second referendum were held tomorrow.

For the first time, we are able to use innovative and unique analysis of British Election Study (BES), Census and Persuasion UK data to estimate the impact of demographic churn on this change versus opinion change. This was only possible in England and Wales because comparable Scottish datasets are less easily accessible in the time we had. A fuller note on how this was done is on the Persuasion website.

Overall, we find that about 2.3 percentage points of the total 13.5 point fall in anti-EU attitudes (or 17% of the total shift) comes from more Leave-inclined voters ‘exiting the electorate’ – a euphemism mostly accounted for by deaths, given the older age profile of Leave voters in 2016. On top of that, about 3.3 percentage points (24% of overall change) is created by the relative effect of more pro-EU voters entering the electorate, that is younger voters coming of voting age. **In total, therefore, about 5.6 percentage points of Stay Out’s 13.5-point fall in support is accounted for by demographic churn in both directions.** The remaining 7.9 percentage points (or 59% of total change) comes from persuasion, that is, 2016 Leave voters changing their mind on the matter.

We can see how these forces have moved over time in the chart below, while the table shows the relative effect of demography and persuasion on Leave/Stay Out opinion in every region of England and Wales.

In short, even before you get to persuasion, demographic change alone has taken Leave 2016 to 48% of the estimated voting population. All of this is fluid, given the potential for new entrants to change their mind in a campaign or indeed for non-voters to turnout and vote in unpredictable ways, but it is a large factor pulling UK public attitudes towards the EU.




Demography alone has pushed Leave below 50%, with persuasion doing the rest

Estimated Leave/Stay-Out share among decided voters in England & Wales, 2011-2025. The navy line applies 2016 opinions to each year's actual electorate, so its fall is purely demographic (deaths and new voters). The lilac line applies today's opinions; the gap between the lines is opinion change.


Actual 2016 referendum result (England & Wales): 53.4%. 90% intervals: navy ± 0.8 pt, lilac ± 3 pts.

■ Leave share, holding 2016 opinions fixed (demographic change only) ■ Stay-Out share at today's opinion



Source: Tom Pruchnow for Persuasion UK / IPPR. Models: British Election Study Internet Panel (w9, 2016) and Persuasion UK survey (June 2026); populations: ONS Census 2011 & 2021, APS, EHS, mid-year estimates

 Persuasion UK




Demographic table: accumulative impact of deaths, persuasion and new entrants to electorate respectively on Leave/Stay Out share of electorate

Geography (England and Wales)	2016 Leave vote	2025 Stay Out – accounting for deaths only	2025 Stay Out – accounting for persuasion among those eligible in 2016 and still alive	2025 Stay Out opinion – accounting for new entrants to electorate	Total % of change accounted for by exit	Total % of change accounted for by persuasion	Total % of change accounted for by new entry	Total
National	53.3	51.0 (-2.3)	43.1 (-7.9)	39.8 (-3.3)	17%	59%	24%	-13.5
East	56.4	54.1 (-2.4)	46.5 (-7.6)	43.5 (-3.0)	18%	59%	23%	-13
East Midlands	58	55.7 (-2.3)	44.9 (-10.8)	41.5 (-3.4)	14%	66%	20%	-16.5
London	41.1	38.6 (-2.6)	32.9 (-5.6)	29.9 (-3.0)	23%	50%	27%	-11.2
North East	57.2	54.7 (-2.4)	41.7 (-13.0)	38.3 (-3.4)	13%	69%	18%	-18.8
North West	53.8	51.3 (-2.5)	43.9 (-7.4)	40.4 (-3.4)	19%	55%	26%	-13.4
South East	54.3	51.6 (-2.7)	43.6 (-7.9)	40.6 (-3.0)	20%	58%	22%	-13.7
South West	53.5	51.8 (-1.7)	46.0 (-5.8)	42.6 (-3.4)	16%	53%	31%	-10.9
Wales	50.7	48.4 (-2.3)	42.1 (-6.3)	39.0 (-3.2)	20%	53%	27%	-11.8
West Midlands	57.8	54.9 (-2.8)	44.7 (-10.2)	41.3 (-3.4)	17%	62%	21%	-16.4
Yorkshire and the Humber	55.9	53.7 (-2.2)	46.0 (-7.6)	42.5 (-3.5)	17%	57%	26%	-13.4

A matter of preference

It is worth briefly noting that the above polling and analysis is based on a Rejoin vs Stay Out binary. This may well be the question that politicians put to the electorate in the future, and thus the most relevant one, but it is not the natural division of public opinion on the UK's future relationship with Europe.


Instead, as we can see, when asked to give their first preference, we see a more fractured picture where 42% of voters' first preference involves Rejoining on some terms, with a crucial 14% of voters who – though many may be ok with Rejoining – have their first preference as staying outside of the EU but with much greater economic integration with it, for instance entering the customs union or the single market. These groups are joined by 22% of voters, largely Conservative voters, who want to stay outside the EU but have friendlier economic relations in broad terms (short of customs union or single market) and then 8% who want the most distant political and economic relationship possible with Europe. About 12% of the electorate have no firm opinion.



UK-EU relations: voters first preference

About 42% of voters first preference involves re-entering the EU - either on old terms or whatever terms necessary, less than the 52% headline Rejoin. There is a decent chunk of voters who are ok with Rejoin when asked but whose first preference is a closer economic relationship of some kind.


- The UK should rejoin the EU on whatever terms are required
- The UK should rejoin the EU on the same terms as before
- The UK should stay out of the EU, but have closer economic integration by rejoining the customs union or single market
- The UK should stay out of the EU, but have friendlier economic relations with the EU
- The UK should stay out of the EU and have the most distant economic relationship possible with the EU
- Other
- Don't know



Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, n=3039 UK voters, nat rep, 11th-15th June 2026

 Persuasion UK

Nevertheless, at the moment, in headline polling, Rejoin is carrying a majority because it's able to consolidate the first three of these groups plus a sliver of don't knows. But how robust are these to stress testing? We will see in the following two sections.




Section 3: Stress testing support for Rejoin and Closer Relationship, experiment 1 of 2: giving more people basic information

One weakness of headline polling is it does not necessarily expose people to concrete elements of Rejoin or Closer Relationship, whether good or bad. This is a particular problem for judging the solidity of opinion on Brexit/the UK's relationship with the EU at a time when the topic itself is presently low salience, as we saw in section 1. These elements may push up or down on opinion, and would be surfaced in any renewed political competition over the matter, but are understandably not factored into headline polling questions. It is therefore important to measure opinion while exposing people to these.

Approach

In this section at least, we try to introduce these elements to people as neutrally as possible. We do so through using a conjoint or vignette experiment. A representative sample of just under 3,000 UK voters were invited into this experiment. They were presented with a 'deal' or proposal on future UK-EU relations that was composed of the following variables:

- **Membership status:** with two options, full Rejoin or Closer Relationship.
- A **benefit** of the new relationship to the UK. One benefit was drawn at random from a list of eleven. Benefits only relevant to Rejoin were only shown in Rejoin arm of the experiment and not Closer Relationship, and vice versa (linked to what 'membership status' people saw, per the above).
- An **obligation** of the new relationship on the UK. One was drawn at random from a list of twelve, with the same exclusions applying as with benefits.
- **Negotiating time** was also randomised, ranging from a deal that is ready to be implemented immediately to one requiring five years to negotiate and implement.
- In addition, respondents saw one **pro-message** from advocates of the deal and one **anti-message** from opponents.



Elements within every category were completely randomised for each survey respondent. *One example platform, captured totally at random, is below.*

Screenshot of example conjoint platform – seen by just one respondent in experiment

VIGNETTE PREVIEW

Imagine that the following deal with the EU was put to a referendum of UK voters to accept or reject. Please take a moment to read the details of the deal.

THE FOLLOWING DEAL WITH THE EU HAS BEEN PROPOSED:

The UK rejoins the European Union as a full member

THOSE WHO ARE PRO THE NEW AGREEMENT SAY:

Brexit means British families spend hours stuck in passport queues every time they go on holiday to Europe. We deserve better than that. This deal means British people can travel to Europe freely again – no queues, no hassle.

YOU'VE HEARD THAT:

UK citizens have freedom of movement to the EU – they can move to the EU to live or work without needing a visa

UK citizens travel to the EU without the need for extensive processes at EU borders

The negotiating process is complete and the deal can be implemented immediately

THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST THE AGREEMENT SAY:

Britain's NHS is crumbling, living costs are soaring and communities have been left behind for years. None of that has anything to do with Brexit. Rejoining the EU won't fix any of it – it just gives politicians an excuse to avoid the things that actually matter.


Respondents were asked whether they would **accept or reject the deal before them**.

In the analysis phase we can observe two things: what the average level of acceptance is across all of these randomisations and scenarios and, as importantly, which categories or elements push up or down on support for Rejoining and a Closer Relationship.

The full wording of every one of the elements and what arm of the experiment they appeared under is in Annex A of this report. All policy judgements on likely benefits and obligations were informed by input from IPPR's policy team.

Results: overall averages

Overall, we find that, on average, a majority for Rejoin survives – but it is significantly lower than headline polling suggests.




On average in the experiment, 52% of respondents chose to accept the Rejoin deal before them, with 48% choosing to reject – a marked difference from 64–36% we saw in section 2. Closer Relationship is a shade more comfortable at 58% vs 42%.

There are some partisan differences here, as you would expect, and the ‘Closer Relationship premium’ – that is, the higher level of support in this arm – was mostly felt among older voters and especially Conservative voters.

Average outcome scores from conjoint experiments: Rejoin and Closer Relationship

Both Rejoin and Closer Relationship cleared 50% on average, although Closer Relationship cleared it far more comfortably




Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, 25th–30th June 2026, n=2,907 UK adults.
Conjoint/vignette experiment.



Average conjoint outcomes by 2024 vote: Rejoin vs Closer Relationship

Average % accepting/rejecting each deal across all configurations tested, among those expressing a view. Every group is a little warmer towards a Closer Relationship than Rejoin. The gap is largest for 2024 Conservative (+8pts) and Reform (+5pts) voters, and smallest for Labour, Lib Dem and Green voters, who accept either.

Accept deal Reject deal




Source: Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, 25th–30th June 2026, n=2,907 UK adults.
Conjoint/vignette experiment

 Persuasion UK

Overall, it is an interesting coincidence that the average support for Rejoin vs Stay Out here is 52–48% – not because of the reverse with 2016, but because of how it compares to the demographic churn analysis in section 2. As outlined above, this found that support for Stay Out was about 48% when just accounting for demographic churn, and about 39–40% when accounting for churn and persuasion – i.e. Leave 2016 voters changing their mind. One interpretation of the results of the stress testing conjoint in this section, then, is that it essentially reverses the impact of persuasion and leaves Rejoin reliant on demographic factors.

Results: influential elements pushing away from the EU

Within the results, there are clear factors pulling people towards a pro-EU position and those pushing them away. These are reasonably consistent across both Rejoin and Closer Relationship, it's



just that the latter seemingly starts from a more comfortable position so weathers them better.

We can start with the push factors.

There are a few obligations that push support for Rejoining under 50%. The most noteworthy of these concerns the Euro. Even a hypothetical commitment (“at some point in the future”) completely sinks Rejoin, sending it to 45% on average when this appeared in the Rejoin platform. Though such a commitment may be only nominal in reality, it seems clear that it needs to be taken off the table entirely for Rejoin to even get a hearing with voters.

Two other negative elements concern fishing access to UK waters – a source of controversy prior to 2016 – and then the UK exiting independent trade deals it has negotiated since then. The salience of this is arguably surprising, given its technicality and remoteness, but may well speak to a sense among voters of ‘sunk cost’ of Brexit – a desire to not write off what’s been gained given how much effort went into establishing these deals. This is even a weakness for Closer Relationship, being a likely obligation in this scenario.


Since the UK cannot have a fully independent trade policy with third party countries while being in the EU, this is not something that can be negotiated away but rather would have to be neutralised.

What impact do different *OBLIGATIONS* of Rejoin and Closer Relationship have on support for the proposition?


Graph shows % of voters in conjoint experiment opting to accept a deal for either Rejoin or Closer Relationship when this element is seen. Some elements were only seen within Rejoin version of experiment as they were judged to be unrealistic for a Closer Relationship scenario.

The Euro, fishing and exiting independent trade deals emerge here as large drags on support for Rejoin and, notably in the case of trade deals, Closer Relationship. Contributions to EU budgets also has a slight drag effect on Rejoin.

Deal type ● Rejoin ● Closer relationship



Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, 25th–30th June 2026, n=2,907 UK adults. Conjoint/vignette experiment.



The results on freedom of movement are also intriguing here. In neutrally stated terms, freedom of movement of EU citizens to the UK is not the deal breaker that it was in 2016. In fact, it actually helps Rejoin to narrowly perform above the average results in the experiment. This may reflect a positive turn in public sentiment to EU migrants – some of which may be based on the perceived economic benefits of such migration, others of which may be racialised and a function of increased hostility to *non*-EU migration and asylum. Alternatively, it may reflect a renewed understanding of the benefits of freedom of movement generally to UK citizens – or else some combination of both.

Before we reach too firm a conclusion there, though, there is some fly in the ointment. When we turn to potent anti-messages, we see that the anti-freedom of movement message – framed in a hostile way as ‘opening the floodgates again’ drags support for Rejoin down. This suggests that tolerance towards free movement is a little soft and still vulnerable to opposition framing.

Also potent as an anti message is EU budget contributions, something which was present in 2016 but may be given extra potency by cost of living concerns and tight government budgets generally.


Less potent is ‘tell them again’ or ‘your vote didn’t count’, a message that some commentators imagine to be a dealbreaker. This reflects the fact that many people feel Brexit has been a negative and many voters likely do not want to hear overly partisan messages to the contrary; they do not consider it a discussion totally beyond the bounds of permissibility, even if it is one they are cautious on.

What impact do different **ANTI EUROPE MESSAGES** have on support for Rejoin and Closer Relationship?

Graph shows % of voters in conjoint experiment opting to accept a deal for either Rejoin or Closer Relationship when this message is seen. Some messages were only seen within Rejoin version of experiment as they were judged to be unrealistic for a Closer Relationship scenario.

An ‘opening the floodgates’ message which more aggressively reminds people of the downsides of FoM pushed down on support for Rejoin, while budget contributions and the lost sunken cost of exited trade deals were again a drag.

Deal type ● Rejoin ● Closer relationship






Finally, there seems to be a willingness to give 12-18 months of government time and focus to the future EU-UK relationship but no desire for much longer. We saw this in baseline polling and focus groups, too. Certainly the 4-5 year process which we saw last time scarred people, with all of politics consumed by a single issue for what seemed like an eternity to voters themselves, distracting as they saw it from other more pressing issues. This exhaustion and ‘faff factor’ is underrated as a dynamic in otherwise pro-EU leaning attitudes.

What impact do different **NEGOTIATING TIMES** of Rejoin and Closer Relationship have on support for the proposition?

Graph shows % of voters in conjoint experiment opting to accept a deal for either Rejoin or Closer Relationship when this element is seen.

5 years negotiating time pulls down on support for both Rejoin and Closer Relationship, but 18 months and under is fine in this experiment

Deal type ● Rejoin ● Closer relationship




Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, 25th-30th June 2026, n=2,907 UK adults.
Conjoint/vignette experiment.

Persuasion UK

Results: influential elements pushing towards the EU

On the upside for those advocating for Rejoin, and downside for those opposing it, many factors did pull people towards a pro-EU position including Rejoin.

Many of the best-performing benefits of the EU line up with the best performing messages.



For instance, two messages related to the economy helped Rejoin perform above the experiment average, notably related to the UK falling behind other major countries and small businesses being buried under paperwork caused by Brexit. Single market and customs union also perform above average as a benefit of Rejoin, the latter being the key asset of Closer Relationship.


The best performing pro-EU message overall though related to travel, and in particular passport checks and queues faced by Britons when travelling abroad to the EU since Brexit, which can sometimes be very lengthy and noticeable. In this context, outbound freedom of movement becomes one of the best performing assets of Rejoin. This is part of what makes the politics of freedom of movement more contested than in 2016.

It should also be noted that themes of defence and security – ‘a dangerous world’ – and closer-cooperation with the EU have potency for *both* Rejoin and Closer Relationship, with defence co-operation being one of the best performing benefits on offer via the latter. All this likely reflects people’s response to the chaotic and unpredictable presidency of Donald Trump in the US and a sense that America is no longer as reliable a partner for the UK; a push to the EU makes sense in this context for many voters especially those of a more centre-right orientation.

What impact do different *BENEFITS* of Rejoin and Closer Relationship have on support for the proposition?

Graph shows % of voters in conjoint experiment opting to accept a deal for either Rejoin or Closer Relationship when this element is seen. Some elements were only seen within Rejoin version of experiment as they were judged to be unrealistic for a Closer Relationship scenario

The best performing Rejoin element is single market membership and freedom of movement for UK voters. For closer relationship, it's the customs union and defence and security co-operation. All elements performed better than control within this category.





What impact do different *PRO EUROPE MESSAGES* have on support for Rejoin and Closer Relationship?

Graph shows % of voters in conjoint experiment opting to accept a deal for either Rejoin or Closer Relationship when this message is seen. Some messages were only seen within Rejoin version of experiment as they were judged to be unrealistic for a Closer Relationship scenario.

Travel, security/defence and the economy (investment) are the messages with upward pull on Rejoin compared to average

Deal type ● Rejoin ● Closer relationship



Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK, 25th-30th June 2026, n=2,907 UK adults. Conjoint/vignette experiment.

Persuasion UK

The only other thing worth noting here is that many of the best performing messages are more transactional; despite the growth of a more visible and motivated pro-EU segment of the population and civil society, most Britons' relationship with the positive side of the Europe project remains utilitarian. That said, the identity based message of 'Britain is European' did help Rejoin perform above average, even if it was still relatively mid-table overall.

To see these results broken down by 2024 party vote, see the full deck of graphs published alongside this report on the Persuasion UK website. For full text of both pro and anti messages and all other elements tested in this section, see Annex A of the report.



Section 4: Stress testing support for Rejoin and Closer Relationship, experiment 2 of 2: exposing people to likely media representations of various deal elements

Approach


In this section, we look to build on what we learnt from section 3 and see if it holds in more realistic information environments than a standard conjoint can provide. This is because, in the reality of any second referendum or political competition on this issue, people will not be exposed to information about the pros and cons of different Rejoin or Closer Relationship deal elements in purely factual terms, but through the medium of news headlines – some good faith, some bad, some neutral. In addition, all of these will compete for voter attention among other issues, notably for many on crowded social media feeds.


For our second stress test, then, we recruited around 11,000 people into an experiment where we put them into a mock social media feed. Alongside unrelated content in this feed were mocked-up headlines related to one element of a new UK-EU deal. One of these was a bad faith interpretation – or one highlighting potentially negative facets – one other was more positive, and the other neutral.

After being in this feed, and exposed to the headlines once more at the end of the experiment, respondents took a poll on Rejoin and Closer Relationship and we can see how exposure to different media angles impacted attitudes. Using information from the mocked environment format, we can also see what – if anything – they paid most attention to in their feed.

An example screenshot – in this case from those exposed to the ‘travel’ element of a UK-EU deal – is below. The full wording of each media headline is contained in Annex B.

Screenshot of social media stress testing experiment - from ‘travel’ element:





Results

Two major weak points jump out from the experiment whether the deal is Rejoin or Closer Relationship. The attacks on EU budget payments seemed to over-power the alternative framings so strongly that it pushed down support for Rejoin and Closer Relationship by 8-9 points. In addition, attacks on a commitment to the Euro also moved support down by 8 points. Both of these effects were statistically significant to 95%.


Just below them is a small negative effect on EU citizens living and working in the UK, although this was just outside of significance at a 95% confidence level. Likewise, mobility benefits to UK citizens and the benefits of the customs union to businesses performed positively although likewise both fell just short of the highest standard of statistical significance.

All in all, this is reassuringly similar to what we found in section 3, the initial stress testing, of this report. Namely, the Euro is a deal breaker that EU advocates must neutralise unambiguously, while budget payments – stronger in potency in this experiment than the previous – has the potential to be framed very negatively by opponents. Travel and business benefits remains an asset throughout both experiments, with freedom of movement less uncontested than during the 2016 referendum.

Stress testing experiment: what impact does each element have on support for Rejoin and Closer Relationship, when tested in a more realistic media information environment?

Experiment respondents were put into a fake social media feed and shown positive, negative and neutral examples of media coverage of each element.

The figures show change in support for Rejoin and Closer Relationship after exposure to all media coverage for this element – compared to control (no coverage), in percentage points. Navy dots: significant at the 95% level. Lilac; within margin of error



Source: Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK / IPPR · UK-EU deal message stress test, 2026 · Control group saw only the announcement of negotiations



The fight for attention: which deal elements get noticed

Each dot is one deal element from the stress test. Vertical: % spontaneously recalling the story unprompted (dashed line = control baseline, 23.3%). Horizontal: among those recalling it, the share recalling the favourable framing minus the share recalling the critical framing.

Level of recall



Source: Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK / IPPR · UK-EU deal message stress test, 2026 · Descriptive measures within treatment arms; recall figures as reported by Convergent






Concluding thoughts

A decade on from Brexit, UK voters overwhelmingly view leaving the European Union in a negative fashion. In addition, significant demographic churn and change has altered the electorate since 2016 in ways that matter when the original result was secured by a four percentage point margin.

It is likely that if they were offered the UK to rejoin the EU tomorrow, immediately, on the previous terms of membership, a majority would probably be secured for this. However, it is in the distance between the principle of that and the messy reality of real-world politics and negotiations that a great deal of softness lies in support for Rejoin in particular. Voters may view Brexit negatively but they have also become exhausted with the issue, while certain conditions of re-entry are highly vulnerable to opposition attack. The argument on the future of UK-EU relations remains up for grabs – and has moved in a pro-EU direction since 2016 – but it is a long way from settled.




Annex A: full wording of options tested in conjoint/vignette experiment

Type of deal

Element (full text as shown to respondents)	Rejoin	Closer relationship
The UK rejoins the European Union as a full member	✓	
The UK stays outside the European Union but has a much closer relationship		✓
Not shown (control — element omitted from the vignette)		

Benefits

Element (full text as shown to respondents)	Rejoin	Closer relationship
The UK would be a member of the customs union, meaning UK businesses can trade with the EU with less costs	✓	✓
The UK would be part of defence and security co-operation across the EU, including defence procurement programs and intelligence sharing networks	✓	✓
UK professional qualifications and licenses would be recognised in the EU	✓	✓
UK students would regain access to ERASMUS, the study abroad program to the EU	✓	✓
The UK will be able to borrow at the lower rates available to European countries	✓	—
The UK will gain access to EU infrastructure and regional development funds	✓	—
The UK would be a member of the single market, meaning UK businesses can trade with the EU without friction	✓	—
The UK would rejoin the Dublin convention, theoretically making it easier to deport asylum seekers arriving on 'small boats' back to the EU from the UK	✓	—
UK citizens have freedom of movement to the EU - they can move to the EU to live or work without needing a visa	✓	—
UK citizens travel to the EU without the need for extensive processes at EU borders	✓	—
UK workers would be protected by stronger workers rights legislation	✓	—
Not shown (control — element omitted from the vignette)	✓	✓




Obligations

Element (full text as shown to respondents)	Rejoin	Closer relationship
The UK accepts EU regulations on products, services and labour standards, limiting its ability to set different rules domestically	✓	✓
The UK cannot negotiate its own trade deals and would have to exit trade deals negotiated with countries outside of the EU since Brexit	✓	✓
The UK will accept EU regulations on products, services and labour standards	✓	✓
The UK will accept the supremacy of EU law/European Court of Justice in certain key areas	✓	✓
EU fishing fleets would be granted full and continuous access to UK waters	✓	—
The UK accepts freedom of movement - any EU citizen can move to the UK to live or work without needing a visa	✓	—
The UK commits to adopt the Euro instead of the pound at some point in the future	✓	—
The UK will make financial contributions to EU budgets	✓	—
The UK aligns its regulations with the EU's to make trade easier	—	✓
The UK enters into a closer defence and security agreement with the EU	—	✓
The UK joins the Customs Union	—	✓
The UK will make financial contributions to the EU	—	✓
Not shown (control — element omitted from the vignette)	✓	✓


Negotiation time

Element (full text as shown to respondents)	Rejoin	Closer relationship
The final negotiation process will take 6 months before it can be implemented	✓	✓
The negotiating process is complete and the deal can be implemented immediately	✓	✓
The negotiation process will take five years before it can be implemented	✓	✓
The negotiation process will take one year and half before it can be implemented	✓	✓
The negotiation process will take one year before it can be implemented	✓	✓
Not shown (control — element omitted from the vignette)	✓	✓



Pro-EU messages (1 of 2) — “Supporters of the deal are arguing...”

Element (full text as shown to respondents)	Rejoin	Closer relationship
Brexit has made Britain poorer. Restricting trade with our biggest trading partner has fed through to higher prices and slower growth. Britain deserves an economy that works. This deal is in Britain’s best economic interests.	✓	✓
Brexit politicians promised £350m for the NHS, control of our borders and booming new trade deals. None of it happened. The British people were deceived, and we are still paying the price. This deal is a chance to be honest about what went wrong – and to fix it.	✓	✓
In this increasingly unstable world, Britain must uphold the values of peace, democracy, and the rule of law. Britain punches above its weight on the international stage, but it cannot stand alone. These are values we share with the EU and together our voice is stronger.	✓	✓
Since Brexit, British businesses have been buried under paperwork and extra costs just to sell into the market on our doorstep. This deal tears down those walls and lets British businesses compete on a level playing field.	✓	✓
We are living in an increasingly dangerous world – with Putin at war on the continent and America turning its back on its allies. In times like these, working with those we trust is paramount. This deal brings the UK back to the heart of Europe’s defence and security framework so we can stand stronger together when it matters most.	✓	✓
Brexit means British families spend hours stuck in passport queues every time they go on holiday to Europe. We deserve better than that. This deal means British people can travel to Europe freely again – no queues, no hassle.	✓	—




Pro-EU messages (2 of 2)

Element (full text as shown to respondents)	Rejoin	Closer relationship
Britain is a European country and always will be. Brexit cut Britain off from the continent we have always been part of – politically, culturally, historically. This deal puts us back where we belong: at the table, shaping Europe’s future alongside our closest neighbours and allies.	✓	—
Britain’s future prosperity relies on investment in good jobs and safe supply chains. But the US, China and Europe can make much bigger investments than the UK can alone – we need to rejoin, or we will fall behind.	✓	—
Rejoining the EU is good for workers. Better paid leave, no zero hour contracts, stronger dismissal protections. This deal will help protect us from those who want to exploit us.	✓	—
The Westminster policymaking process leaves huge parts of Britain behind. This deal with the EU gives councils and communities more control over their financial futures and is a key step towards a more equal Britain.	✓	—
This new deal restores the right of Brits to learn, work, and put down roots right across Europe. We have a proud history as an open and welcoming country and this deal also allows our European neighbours to contribute to Britain’s future.	✓	—
Not shown (control — element omitted from the vignette)	✓	✓


Anti-EU messages (1 of 2) – “Opponents of the deal are arguing...”

Element (full text as shown to respondents)	Rejoin	Closer relationship
Brexit meant we stopped sending billions to Brussels every year. This deal means the cheques start again – year after year, while our NHS, schools and communities are crying out for investment. A costly mistake.	✓	✓
Britain’s NHS is crumbling, living costs are soaring and communities have been left behind for years. None of that has anything to do with Brexit. This deal won’t fix any of it – it just gives politicians an excuse to avoid the things that actually matter.	✓	✓
Every time British politicians have sat down with Brussels, we’ve come away with a worse deal than we expected. Nothing has changed. The EU will demand maximum concessions, give minimum ground, and our politicians will sign whatever is put in front of them.	✓	✓
Since leaving, Britain has struck trade deals across the world that we could never have negotiated as EU members. Now Westminster wants to tear those up and hand our trade policy back to Brussels. We’d be giving away real gains for the promise of something that may never deliver.	✓	✓
We’ve already lost too many years arguing with Europe. It’s a distraction from the country’s real problems.	✓	✓



Anti-EU messages (2 of 2)

Element (full text as shown to respondents)	Rejoin	Closer relationship
In 2016, millions of ordinary people voted to leave – many for the first time in their lives. Rejoining now would be the political class saying: we know better, your vote didn't count, we're undoing it. That is a betrayal of democracy, plain and simple.	✓	—
This deal is a humiliation. Britain spent years fighting to leave the EU. Going back now, on whatever terms Brussels chooses to offer, would be a national embarrassment — a signal to the world that Britain lacks the confidence to stand on its own. We are better than that.	✓	—
This deal will open the flood gates to even more migrants to the UK. In 2016, people voted for control of immigration. This deal hands that straight back to Brussels – uncontrolled migration again, a national betrayal.	✓	—
When Britain voted to leave, the EU tried to punish us – to make an example of Britain and make leaving as painful as possible. Rejoining now tells Brussels that bullying works. Why should we reward that?	✓	—
Not shown (control — element omitted from the vignette)	✓	✓




Annex B: full wording of mock social media feed testing


Each respondent's feed carried three headlines on one randomly assigned deal element: a neutral report (styled as "BBA News"), a supportive case ("The Guard") and a critical attack ("The Moon"). The control group saw only: "The UK is in the process of negotiating a new deal with the EU".
Convergent Opinion for Persuasion UK / IPPR – UK-EU deal message stress test, 2026, n≈11,000

(≈900 per arm).

Deal element	Neutral report (eg BBA News)	Supportive case (eg The Guard)	Critical attack (eg The Moon)
Paying into the EU budget	UK to resume annual financial contributions to the EU budget as part of new deal	NEW EU DEAL MEANS WAVE OF EUROPEAN INVESTMENT - UK buys access to giant EU funds investing in British factories and farms	YOUR BILLIONS, THEIR BRUSSELS GRAVY TRAIN – the cheques to the EU start again, year after year, while OUR hospitals and schools are left to rot. A billions-a-year humiliation
Committing to the euro	UK to commit in principle to adopting the euro at an unspecified future date under rejoin terms	THE POUND ISN'T GOING ANYWHERE – euro pledge is a paper promise with no date and no timetable; Sweden signed the same line 30 years ago and still has the krona	SAY GOODBYE TO THE POUND – rejoin deal signs Britain up to scrap sterling for the euro, handing YOUR money and YOUR economy to bankers in Frankfurt. The ultimate betrayal
EU citizens' right to live & work in UK	EU citizens to regain the right to live and work in the UK under new agreement	THE END OF SHORTAGES - return of free movement will help trained European workers staff NHS, care homes and farms after years of decline	FLOODGATES FLUNG OPEN – unlimited EU migration returns with no cap and no control. In 2016 Britain voted to take back its borders. This deal spits in the face of that vote
Defence & security pact	UK to join EU defence and security pact including intelligence sharing and joint procurement	STRONGER TOGETHER AGAINST PUTIN – with war on the continent and America stepping back, Britain returns to the heart of Europe's defences	EU ARMY BY THE BACK DOOR – our troops, our secrets and our defence handed to Brussels under new pact that could drag YOUR sons and daughters into Europe's wars



Deal element	Neutral report (eg BBA News)	Supportive case (eg The Guard)	Critical attack (eg The Moon)
Full freedom of movement (UK→EU & EU→UK)	Free movement between the UK and EU to be fully restored under new deal	NO QUEUES, NO VISAS, NO HASSLE — free movement deal hands Brits back the right to travel, work and retire right across Europe	UNCONTROLLED MIGRATION IS BACK — Brussels snatches back the keys to Britain's borders as free movement returns in full. Your vote to end it? Overruled
Asylum returns (Dublin rules)	UK to rejoin EU asylum returns system, allowing small boat arrivals to be sent back to Europe	SMALL BOAT ARRIVALS CAN BE RETURNED AT LAST — new EU deal means Channel migrants can be returned to Europe for the first time since Brexit	SMALL BOATS SELLOUT — new EU deal sends handful of Channel migrants back to EU while thousands keep coming - AND Britain forced to take MORE asylum seekers
Single market	UK to rejoin EU single market, removing trade barriers for British businesses	LOWER BILLS WITH NEW EU DEAL - Tearing down trade walls will cut costs and free British business	BRUSSELS TO RULE BRITAIN AGAIN — single market stitch-up means EU judges and bureaucrats write our laws while we obey in silence, with no vote and no veto — a betrayal of Brexit
EU airport queues for Brits	Britons to travel across the EU without border checks or visas under new deal	END OF THE AIRPORT QUEUE — Brits will breeze through EU borders again as new deal scraps post-Brexit passport checks and paperwork for good	SURRENDER AT THE BORDER — deal that lets Brits skip airport queues hands Brussels the keys to YOUR borders, with unlimited migration the price of a faster holiday
Five-year process	UK's return to the EU expected to take five years to negotiate and implement	FIVE YEARS TO GET IT RIGHT — Britain will take the time needed to secure the best possible EU deal, protecting jobs, families and businesses from damaging disruption	FIVE MORE YEARS OF BREXIT HELL — NHS on its knees, bills through the roof, and this Government chooses half a decade of squabbling with Brussels instead. They've learned nothing



Deal element	Neutral report (eg BBA News)	Supportive case (eg The Guard)	Critical attack (eg The Moon)
UK citizens' right to live & work in EU	UK citizens to regain the right to live and work across the EU under new agreement	YOUR RIGHT TO LIVE AND WORK IN 27 COUNTRIES IS BACK — new deal restores freedom for Brits to move, study, work and retire anywhere in Europe	THE GREAT MIGRATION BETRAYAL — 'right to live in Europe' deal means return of freedom of movement, so anyone in the EU can move here, no cap, no checks, no say — everything 17.4 million voted to end
Customs union	UK to rejoin EU customs union, cutting costs and checks for exporters	EXPORT RED TAPE SCRAPPED — customs union return ends the border checks and costs that have strangled British firms since Brexit	TRADE SURRENDER — Britain's hard-won global deals ripped up and thrown in the bin as Brussels grabs back control of what YOU can buy and sell - a betrayal of Brexit

